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Abstract: Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a vessel tracking system, which since 
2004 has become a global tool for the detection and analysis of sea-going traffic. In this 
article, we look at how this technology, initially designed as a collision avoidance system, has 
recently become involved in debates concerning migration across the Mediterranean Sea. In 
particular, after having briefly discussed its emergence and characteristics, we examine how 
through different practices of (re-)appropriation AIS, and the data it generates, have been 
seized upon, both to contest and to sustain the exclusionary nature of borders, and the mass 
dying of migrants at sea to which it leads. We do so by referring to forms of data activism we 
have contributed to in the frame of our Forensic Oceanography project, as well as to 
situations in which AIS has been mobilized by xenophobic groups to demand even stronger 
exclusionary measures. At the same time, we point to the multiplicity of actors who 
participate in the politics of migration through AIS in unexpected ways. We conclude by 
highlighting the irreducible ambivalence of practices of appropriation and call for persistent 
attention to one’s own positioning within the global datascape constituted by AIS and other 
data. 
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[FIGURE 1] 
[FIGURE 1 CAPTION: Video monitoring the activities of Search and Rescue non-
governmental organizations through AIS vessel tracking data, GEFIRA, 5 December 2016. 
https://gefira.org/en/2016/12/04/ngos-are-smuggling-immigrants-into-europe-on-an-
industrial-scale/] 
 
Sometime around mid-November 2016, a strange video appeared on Youtube, purporting to 
reveal an hitherto hidden “truth” about the so-called migration crisis in Europe. For anyone 
who had been following closely cross-Mediterranean migration over the previous years, the 
map that appeared in the video covering more than half of the background looked familiar. It 
encompassed the coast of Libya in the lower section, all the way up to include the whole of 
Sicily in the top part. This is an area crossed by what the EU border agency Frontex refers to 
as the “Central Mediterranean Route,” a stretch of sea across that more than 30,000 migrant 
deaths have been recorded in nearly 30 years, making this the deadliest migrant crossing in 
the world.1 Yet the accelerated pace of the video, together with the elegiac piano soundtrack, 
made for a rather uncanny and disturbing watch: ships appearing as little triangles on the map, 
later revealed to be non-governmental rescue vessels, frantically ran up and down across the 
two sides of the Mediterranean in what at first sight might have looked like a busy shipping 
lane. A caption appearing on the right hand side of the screen made explicit the video’s 
political message. “For two months,” the text explained, “using marinetraffic.com, we have 
monitored movements of ships owned by NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and have 
kept track of the arrivals of African immigrants. It turned out we were witness to a huge scam 
and illegal human traffic operation. NGOs, smugglers, the mafia in collusion with 
governments, under the pretext of rescuing people, have shipped thousands of illegals into 
Europe.” Interestingly enough, the particular evidence put forward to “demonstrate” this 
alleged scam didn’t come from direct observation or from statistical data collected by Italian 
authorities and international organizations, but from one of the many commercial providers of 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) data routinely used to track sea-going vessels and 
avoid collisions. Based on a tendentious interpretation of the movement of vessels recorded 
by AIS data, the voiceover weaved a narrative of suspicion and collusion.  
 
The video was published by Gefira, a Dutch think-tank that for several years has embraced 
explicitly xenophobic positions (Bagnoli 2017). It quickly went viral, spearheading a virulent 
smear campaign against NGOs operating rescue at sea and thus offering a striking example of 
the contested role vessel tracking technologies have come to play in the politics of migration. 
NGOs had taken to the sea in the attempt to close the lethal rescue gap left by the EU and its 
member states after the termination of the Italian Navy operation Mare Nostrum in autumn 
2014. While they have successfully demonstrated their life-saving role by making the 
crossing less dangerous, they have subsequently been accused of colluding with smugglers 
and encouraging migrants to attempt the perilous sea crossing, thus endangering their lives. 
The use of vessel tracking data became almost a staple in the ensuing heated debates about 
the role of NGOs: other videos based on the same data were published,2 and a commission by 
the Italian Senate released a report on the subject that disturbingly resembled Gefira’s video 
in its use of AIS. 
 
[FIGURE 2] 
[FIGURE 2 CAPTION: AIS tracks of NGO ships contained in the final document produced 
by the Defense commission of the Italian Senate, published on 16 May 2017.] 
 
Of interest to us here is how a relatively obscure remote sensing technology initially designed 
as a collision avoidance system has, in the past few years, not only provided crucial 
information that has fuelled the heated debate surrounding the politics of migration across the 
Mediterranean, but has also become a point of contention in and of itself. More precisely, as 
activists and practitioners who have ourselves often used this data for several years in our 
quest to document and contest the violence of the European border regime, we are interested 
in understanding how this technology has been seized upon to contest and to sustain (but also, 
as we will show, to avoid confronting) that very violence. We use here the notion of the 
“border regime,” which has become quite ubiquitous in critical migration and border studies, 
to signal how contemporary borders “include a multitude of actors whose practices relate to 
each other but are not ordered in the form of a central logic or rationality; rather, [it] implies a 
space of negotiating practices” (Tsianos and Karakayali 2010) that resists a simply binary 
opposition between pro- and anti-migrant actors and tools. The question we want to ask is: 
How has the information generated by AIS vessel tracking technologies, through practices of 
“inscription” and “visualisation” (Latour 1986), shaped the politics of migration? In other 
words, how have the (remote) sensing practices and knowledges of multiple actors together 
contributed to determine who can move and in what condition, thereby shaping the 
contentious force field of migration? How has this very same information been turned into 
potential evidence both of human rights violations and of illegal trespassing, circulating 
across different forums and becoming the object of conflicting interpretations? In this 
commentary, we will attempt to show how the “techno-political controversy” (Sontowski 
2017) surrounding and constituting AIS participates in this “political situation” (Barry 2012) 
by briefly discussing the emergence and characteristics of this technology, before tracing the 
successive forms of its re-appropriation within the politics of migration.3 We will conclude by 
pointing to the irreducible ambivalence of this technology, and how this demands persistent 
and painstaking attention in positioning ourselves within the global datascape in which AIS 
participates. 
 
AIS’s technopolitics  
 
Despite being a relatively new technology, AIS has become ubiquitous in the maritime 
industry since the end of 2004, when the International Maritime Organisation has made it 
compulsory for all passenger vessels as well as all commercial vessels over a certain size to 
carry an AIS transponder. 4  The latter broadcasts at regular intervals via a VHF radio 
transmitter its vessel ID information as well as details relative to its position and movement 
that are constantly collected by a built-in GPS receiver and other navigational sensors.5 The 
signal is then detected by terrestrial and ship-based receivers and converted into a tabular 
format before being visualized in chartplotters and online maps such as that displayed by 
MarineTraffic. 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
[FIGURE 3 CAPTION: Sample of AIS data. MMSI stands for Maritime Mobile Service 
Identity, a unique identification number for ships and shore station (redacted in the image 
above for reasons of privacy). ] 
 
A history of the emergence and development of AIS remains to be written, and we can only 
provide a glimpse into the meandering genealogy of this system. The technological 
developments that would crystallize in the form of AIS can be traced back to the 1990s, when 
the exponential rise in maritime transportation led Vessel Traffic Services to evolve from 
manual or visual tracking, radar, and voice communications between vessels and coastal 
watchstanders to technologies that made vessel reporting increasingly accurate and automatic. 
AIS was thus intended initially as a short-range system to avoid collisions along busy 
maritime lanes and chokepoints. 6 It was only recently that, in response to newly perceived 
vulnerabilities in global maritime traffic that emerged in the wake of the “war on terror,”7 AIS 
tracking began relying on satellite receivers that extended its coverage far beyond coastal 
areas. This, combined with the proliferation of cloud processing capabilities, big data 
analytics and the integration with GPS technology, has allowed AIS to become “a global tool 
to increase maritime domain awareness,” leading to what has been defined by one of its 
proponents as “the largest paradigm shift in the maritime world since the introduction of the 
steam engine and the screw propeller over 100 years ago” (Thomas 2016).8  
The evolution of AIS into a global sensing apparatus not only mirrors the way in which, for 
instance, similar technological shifts made possible the setting up of an “integrated, multi-
purpose, continual data collection system of a global scale” in oceanographic science 
(Lehman, 2016). It also echoes how, with the introduction of modern astronomical navigation 
in the fifteenth century, Portuguese sailors were able to rebuild their “navigational context 
[…] to include the very heavens […] that stayed with the navigator wherever he might go” 
(Law 1984; see also Sharpe 2016), thus allowing them to be independent from coastal 
observations and undertake oceanic voyages on a global scale. This “borrowing from the 
heavens” was instrumental to the development of means of “long distance control” that 
enabled European colonial expansion, trade and domination (Law 1984).  
Similarly, it could be argued, AIS nowadays constitutes one of the crucial tools within a 
system of logistical integration that is central to global trade and surveillance. Through it, 
logistical operators and core states of the world system attempt to maintain a global (dis-
)order based on the efficient circulation of goods and on policing against near and distant 
threats. In the context of the shipping industry, AIS tracking not only allows collision 
avoidance, but also the optimal management of large fleets towards reduction of fuel 
consumption and maintenance costs. AIS data are also instrumental in achieving very precise 
predictions of commodity prices in many ports of the world. In terms of maritime 
surveillance, AIS is used to detect the threats of terrorism and piracy,9 monitoring fisheries 
and compliance with environmental regulations, and controlling illegalized migration. 10 
Towards this function, AIS data have come to be embedded within a sophisticated and 
increasingly automated apparatus of remote sensing technologies. Vessel tracking is 
supplemented by coastal and ship-borne radars, optical and synthetic aperture radar satellites 
and other sensors so as to achieve the most complete possible “integrated maritime picture.” 
Together, these remote sensing devices compose what Karin Knorr Cetina has called a 
“scopic system,” or, in other words, “an arrangement of hardware, software, and human feeds 
that together function like a scope: like a mechanism of observation and projection [...]” 
(Cetina 2009, 64).  
 AIS data within and against the border regime 
 
This sensorium has also come to play a very important role in the context of the policing of 
migration across the Mediterranean, insofar as states use it to shed light on acts of 
unauthorized border crossing. However, despite the optimistic promises of full-spectrum 
visibility that are ubiquitous in state agencies and surveillance companies’ communiqués, the 
Mediterranean’s scopic system does not produce a totalizing panoptic view, but rather 
operates a form of incomplete and patchy surveillance that constantly runs up against the 
frontiers of information quantity and resolution. The gaps that routinely exist in AIS data are 
a case in point. While these can sometimes indicate a malicious act (the deliberate switching 
off of a transponder in order to hide while undertaking illegal activities), the absence of data 
over a given space and period of time can be due to a number of factors: standard fluctuations 
in the signal strength, the absence of satellite coverage, or poor coverage as the result of the 
lack of a sufficient number of coastal stations, which is particularly acute along the North 
African coast. In this sense there is an uneven geography of AIS coverage, which is partly the 
expression of and contributes to reproducing the Mediterranean’s highly uneven development 
and mobility regime. 
 
[FIGURE 4] 
[FIGURE 4 CAPTION: Map showing the spatial layout of AIS terrestrial station across the 
Mediterranean basin. Highlighted are the only five stations located in North Africa, a very 
low number when compared with the tens that populate the coasts of European countries. 
Source: MarineTraffic.com] 
 
 
The patchiness of the Mediterranean’s scopic system speaks also to the specific “partition of 
the sensible” (Rancière 2006) operating across the Mediterranean frontier and creating 
particular conditions of (dis)appearance, (in)audibility, (in)visibility.11 The light that states 
and border controllers seek to shed on the maritime space is in fact highly selective, and 
keeps in the shadows the violence and violations perpetrated by states at and through the sea.  
 
It is within and against this partition of the sensible that for several years now we, as part of a 
much wider movement of transborder activists struggling against the European border regime, 
have sought to intervene so as to contest this regime of selective (in)visibility. While migrant 
rights organizations have long protested the mass dying of migrants at sea, they were until 
recently unable to document violent events at the maritime frontier with a degree of precision 
sufficient to demand accountability for them. The project Forensic Oceanography (FO) that 
we initiated in 2011 has been part of a series of initiatives claiming and enacting a non-
governmental right to look at and listen in on the seemingly inaccessible spaces of the sea. By 
combining testimonies of survivors with digital technologies––satellite imagery, AIS vessel 
tracking data, geospatial mapping––to document violations, we have sought to use these 
means of surveillance against the grain to exercise a “disobedient gaze” (Pezzani and Heller 
2013), one which refuses to disclose illegalized migration but seeks to unveil instead the 
violence of the border regime. The reports and spatial analysis we have produced have been 
used within existing legal and political forums, supporting the quest for justice of migrants 
and their families in legal proceedings, parliamentary auditions, exhibitions as well as human 
rights and journalistic investigations.  
 
AIS has been central to this endeavor, especially since 2014 when the involvement of 
merchant ships mandated to carry AIS began to be increasingly called upon by coast guard 
agencies to recue migrants in distress in the Mediterranean. While in previous years states had 
been trying to oppose and discourage rescue by commercial vessels with the hope of limiting 
the number of migrants’ arrivals, in early 2015 the shipping industry unwillingly became the 
second largest Search and Rescue (SAR) operator in the Central Mediterranean and a crucial 
actor in the politics of migration, rescuing 14,769 people within only five months. Tangled 
and zig-zagged tracks unequivocally signaling ongoing rescue operations started to become 
more and more ubiquitous in that period on online vessel tracking platforms, thus making AIS 
a privileged observation point of this shift and, more generally, of what was happening at 
sea.12 In our “Death by Rescue” report we used this data to demonstrate how this increasing 
involvement of merchant ships was the direct consequence of the EU’s decision to 
deliberately shut down state-led rescue operations, thus leaving a large gap that shifted the 
burden of extremely complex search and rescue operations onto commercial vessels.13 These, 
however, as shipping industry representatives had warned on several occasions, were unfit for 
the task, and their interventions led to repeated tragedies, as in April 2015, when two 
shipwrecks occurred at the very moment of rescue by merchant ships, leading to more than 
1200 deaths in a single week.14 Relying on AIS data, we were able to reconstruct these 
instances of death by privatized rescue and show how they were not the result of misconduct 
on the part of the commercial ships but rather the unavoidable (and lethal) effect of the EU’s 
policies of non-assistance. 
 
[FIGURE 5] 
[FIGURE 5 CAPTION: The frantic tangle of Automatic Identification System (AIS) vessel 
tracks in the Mediterranean following the 18 April shipwreck. Credit: Forensic 
Oceanography, Death by Rescue report. GIS analysis: Rossana Padeletti. Design: Samaneh 
Moafi.] 
 
While after these two large-scale shipwrecks in spring 2015 the involvement of commercial 
ships dropped significantly, the contextual surge in the number of NGO vessels present 
continue to make AIS a very useful tool for activists and human rights group trying to contest 
the violence of borders at sea. Networks such as the WatchTheMed Alarmphone, which 
receives distress calls from migrants and seeks to ensure that they are swiftly rescued, 
routinely rely on AIS data platforms to contact the closest boat and ensure rescue operations 
are carried out. However, as the Gefira video we discussed at the beginning of this article 
shows, no actor has final ownership over the use of AIS or other sensing technologies. This 
was proven once again in the summer of 2017, when “Identitarian” groups launched their 
anti-migrant “Defend Europe” campaign and deployed their own anti-Search and Rescue 
vessel, the C-star, to hamper search and rescue NGOs operating in the central Mediterranean. 
Defend Europe mobilized AIS data, as GEFIRA had before it, to tendentiously read it as 
evidence of collusion: in particular, they repeatedly pointed to the absence of AIS 
transmission by NGO boats at certain points in time, not as a logical consequence of the 
patchiness of the signal off the coasts of Libya, but as evidence of their covering up of illegal 
activities. In this way, they bought into the already mentioned phantasies of technological 
accuracy that tend to depict digital technologies as infallible. Moreover, they allegedly 
attempted to tamper with search and rescue NGOs AIS signals, as denounced by the NGO 
“Proactiva Open Arms” that had its AIS signal spoofed and transmitting a false position. 
“Defend Europe” used the hacked AIS signal to decry on social media the NGOs’ ship 
presence in close vicinity to Libyan coasts as constituting, in their reading, another sign of 
collusion. 
 
[FIGURE 6] 
[FIGURE 6 CAPTION: Twitter controversy between the “Identitarian” group “Defend 
Europe” and the founder of the search and rescue NGO Proactiva Open Arms in July 2017.] 
 
AIS further came to be used against the C-star itself, as anti-racist and anti-fascist networks 
on both shores of the Mediterranean tracked its movements and mobilized to block its 
docking and refueling in every port it approached.15 The battle for the opening or closure of 
the Mediterranean frontier was fought through AIS, which, after having been used for several 
years by pro-migrant activists and human rights organizations, became one of the tools 
employed by far-right groups to demand even stronger exclusionary measures. 
 
 [FIGURE 7 CAPTION: Map showing the ports that denied access to the identitarian vessel 
C-Star. The text reads: “No to the C-Star vessel of the fascist expedition Defend Europe.” The 
map was produced by Defend Mediterranea, and anti-fascist and anti-racist network and 
included in its 25th August 2017 press release. 
http://www.millebabords.org/spip.php?article30891 ] 
 
 
While we have so far referred to uses of AIS by different actors who take an explicit and 
often irreconcilable stance in regards to migration, we should not forget that within the border 
regime there exists a multiplicity of actors, whose mandate or activities might in principle not 
be concerned with migration as such, but who nevertheless participate in its politics, also 
through their (non-)use of AIS vessel tracking signals and data. The shipping industry 
provides again a good case in point. For instance, the International Chamber of Shipping has 
been very vocal in calling upon states to “provide […] migrants with alternative means of 
finding safety without risking their lives […] in unseaworthy boats,” thus becoming an 
unhoped-for ally for migrants rights advocates (Heller and Pezzani 2015).  And yet 
commercial ships are reported to have been increasingly switching off their AIS transponders 
when transiting in the Central Mediterranean, so as not to become involved in rescue 
operations (Østerbø 2015).  Here again, AIS participates in the politics of migration in 
unexpected ways. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
From a collision avoidance technology, AIS data have become a tool for global-scale 
detection and analysis mobilized in many different fields. They have also come to be seized, 
somewhat surprisingly, as part of an extremely different set of governmental and non-
governmental practices in the field of the politics of migration. Through the “migration” of 
AIS data across these conflicting usages, non-governmental actors seeking to enable, or, on 
the contrary, to hinder migration have come to share some of the same epistemologies, 
technical tools and (sensing) practices, even as AIS data have come to operate as a point of 
contention in their own right.  
 
These events suggest that, contrary to the messianic promises of mainstream new media 
pundits, more data, more images and more information clearly do not produce a more 
“transparent” world that can be technically and consensually managed. Rather, the 
multiplication of forms of registering and visualizing the world seem to lead to a parallel 
increase in the conflicting uses and interpretations of them. This raises challenging questions 
for the actors involved, as the technology itself and each of its uses raise the possibility that 
they will be seized by and spur innovation in the practices of other actors geared at radically 
opposed aims, and even against oneself. While since 2011, as researchers and activists, we 
have contributed to the development of novel uses of surveillance technologies to contest the 
violence of borders, it is likely that far-right actors, who as of 2016 have seized upon AIS 
data to monitor and contest nongovernmental rescue at sea, have learned from our prior 
practice.  
 
We do not, however, consider that the risk of appropriation should limit our engagement with 
different forms of “data activism” (Milan and Gutiérrez 2015) based on AIS. While we are 
certainly critical of right-wing uses of AIS, we in no way lament appropriation as such, which 
might suppose attempting to determine a point of origin for the emergence of this media 
technology and define a “correct” use of it. This would be not only futile, but also deceiving, 
as the complex and unstable genealogy of this technology that we have started to sketch here 
already shows. Practices of appropriation should be understood instead in their “irreducible 
ambivalence,” as a “re-coding of the devices, actors, operational logics and effects of [a given 
technology. This process] implies concessions, compromises and side-effects” (Scheel 
2017).16 If we analyze the “transnational technological zone” (Barry 2012) constituted by AIS 
vessel tracking starting from “the middle,” as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) might say, what 
we observe is rather the constant transformation, both of the technology itself and of its 
different and conflicting uses within an immanent field of contention. Seeking to intervene 
with this field, and engaging in the hand-to-hand struggle over the shifting uses of AIS data 
that have recently multiplied nevertheless, demands of us that we question our own 
positioning within this global datascape with even more persistent and painstaking attention. 
Developing a critical understanding of the web of economic, scientific and political relations 
in which AIS data are embedded appears central to this task, all the more so when considering 
how AIS data exist in a “media ecology that tends to occlude its infrastructural history and 
conditions of possibility” (Helmreich 2011). This endeavor, which we have begun in this 
article, demands to be continued and deepened in the future. 
 
References  
 
Amoore, Louise. 2006. “Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror.” 
Political Geography 25 (3): 336–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.02.001. 
Bagnoli, Lorenzo. 2017. "Who Are Gefira and the 'Identitarians' of Defend Europe? ⁄ Open 
Migration.” Open Migration. 26 September 2017. 
https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/getting-to-know-gefira-and-the-identitarians-
of-defend-europe-our-interviews. 
Barry, Andrew. 2012. "Political Situations: Knowledge Controversies in Transnational 
Governance.” Critical Policy Studies 6 (3): 324–36. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2012.699234. 
Braudel, Fernand. 1972. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of 
Philip II. Vol. 1. Translated by Siân. Reynolds. London: Collins. 
Broeders, Dennis, and Huub Dijstelbloem. 2016. “The Datafication of Mobility and 
Migration Management: The Mediating State and Its Consequences.” In Digitizing 
Identities: Doing Identity in a Networked World, edited by Irma Van der Ploeg and 
Jason Pridmore, 242–60. London: Routledge. 
Cetina, Karin Knorr. 2009. "The Synthetic Situation: Interactionism for a Global World.” 
Symbolic Interaction 32 (1):61–87. 
De Genova, Nicholas. 2013. “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality’: The Scene of Exclusion, the 
Obscene of Inclusion.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36 (7): 1180–98. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.783710. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Helmreich, Stephen. 2011. "From Spaceship Earth to Google Ocean: Planetary Icons, 
Indexes, and Infrastructures.” Social Research 78 (4): 1211–42. 
Heller, Charles, and Lorenzo Pezzani. 2015. “'Sharing the Burden of Rescue': Illegalised Boat 
Migration, the Shipping Industry and the Costs of Rescue in the Central 
Mediterranean.” Border Criminologies - Oxford Law Faculty (blog). 22 October 
2015. https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-
criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2015/11/sharing-burden. 
Latour, Bruno. 1986. "Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together.” In 
Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present, edited 
by Henrika Kuklick and Elisabeth Long, 6:1–40. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Law, John. 1984. "On the Methods of Long-Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation and the 
Portuguese Route to India.” The Sociological Review 32 (1_suppl): 234–63.  
Lehman, Jessica. 2016. "A Sea of Potential: The Politics of Global Ocean Observations.” 
Political Geography 55 (November): 113–23. 
Milan, Stefania, and Miren Gutiérrez. 2015. "Citizens’ Media Meets Big Data: The 
Emergence of Data Activism.” MEDIACIONES 11 (14): 120. 
https://doi.org/10.26620/uniminuto.mediaciones.11.14.2015.120-133.  
Østerbø, Leila. 2015. "Commercial Rescues Down, But Serious Legal Problems Emerge.” 
Xchange (blog). 23 July 2015. http://xchange.org/exclusive-commercial-rescues-
down-but-serious-legal-problems-emerge/. 
Pezzani, Lorenzo, and Charles, Heller. 2013. “A Disobedient Gaze: Strategic Interventions in 
the Knowledge(s) of Maritime Borders.” Postcolonial Studies 16, no. 3 (September 
2013): 289–98. 
Rancière, Jacques. 2006. The Politics of Aesthetics, London: Continuum. 
Steinberg, Philip E. 2001. The Social Construction of the Ocean. Cambridge University Press. 
Scheel, Stephan. 2017. "Real Fake? Appropriating Mobility via Schengen Visa in the Context 
of Biometric Border Controls." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (November): 
1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1401513. 
Sharpe, Christina Elizabeth. 2016. In the Wake: On Blackness and Being. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Sheller, Mimi. 2018. Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes. 
London; Brooklyn, NY: Verso. 
Sontowski, Simon. 2017. "Speed, Timing and Duration: Contested Temporalities, Techno-
Political Controversies and the Emergence of the EU’s Smart Border." Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies (November): 1–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1401512. 
Thomas, Guy. 2003. "A Maritime Traffic-Tracking System Cornerstone Of Maritime 
Homeland Defense." Naval War College Review LVI (4). 
———. 2016. "Satellite AIS: The Largest Maritime Paradigm Shift in Over a Century.” 
ORBCOMM Blog (blog). 30 November 2016. https://blog.orbcomm.com/satellite-ais-
the-largest-maritime-paradigm-shift-in-over-a-century/. 
———. 2017. "Space-Based AIS and Space-Based Radar: A True Synergism for Maritime 
Awareness.” 7 September 2017. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/space-based-ais-
radar-true-synergism-maritime-awareness-guy-thomas. 
Tsianos, Vassilis and Serhat Karakayali. 2010. "Transnational Migration and the Emergence 
of the European Border Regime: An Ethnographic Analysis.” European Journal of 
Social Theory 13 (3): 373–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431010371761. 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 Figure 6 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
 
AUTHORS’ BIO 
Charles Heller is a researcher and filmmaker whose work has a long-standing focus on the 
politics of migration. In 2015, he completed a Ph.D. in Research Architecture at Goldsmiths, 
University of London. He is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the Graduate Institute, in 
Geneva, where is conducts research supported by the Swiss National Fund (SNF).  
Lorenzo Pezzani is an architect and researcher. In 2015, he completed a Ph.D. in Research 
Architecture at Goldsmiths, University of London, where he is currently Lecturer and leads 
the MA studio in Forensic Architecture. His work deals with the spatial politics and visual 
cultures of migration, with a particular focus on the geography of the ocean.  
Working together since 2011, they co-founded the Forensic Oceanography project, that 
critically investigates the militarized border regime and the politics of migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Their collaborative work has been used as evidence in courts of law, 
published across different media and academic outlets, as well as exhibited and screened 
internationally. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The authors would like to thank Philip Steinberg, Jessica Lehman and Jamon Van Den Hoeck 
for their suggestions and encouragement. 
 	1	The	NGO	United	for	Intercultural	Action	has	kept	a	list	of	deaths	since	1993,	recording	“deaths	of	asylum	seekers,	refugees	and	migrants	due	to	the	restrictive	policies	of	Fortress	Europe.”	The	latest	version	(June	2017)	identifies	33.305	deaths,	the	wide	majority	of	which	have	occurred	at	sea.	http://unitedagainstrefugeedeaths.eu/			2	https://www.facebook.com/pg/LucaDofficial/videos/		3	This	paper	sits	at	the	intersections	of	(and	draws	inspiration	from)	several	disciplinary	fields	and	scholarly	concerns:	from	critical	migration	and	border	studies,	especially	works	looking	at	the	aesthetic	(De	Genova,	2013)	and	techno-political	dimensions	of	bordering	(Scheel,	2017;	Sontowski,	2017),	as	well	as	the	dataification	of	border	surveillance	(Broeders	and	Dijstelbloem,	2016;	Amoore,	2006);	from	mobility	studies	(Sheller,	2018)	to	critical	analyses	of	big	data	and	data	activism	(Milan	and	Gutiérrez,	2015)	and	works	dealing	with	the	geography	of	the	ocean	and	the	ocean	as	sensorium	(Steinberg,	2001;	Lehman,	2016).	4	http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/AIS.aspx		5	For	more	information,	see:	https://help.marinetraffic.com/hc/en-us/articles/205426887-What-kind-of-information-is-AIS-transmitted-		6	See	for	instance:	Ulysses	Mullins,	“Leveraging	Technology	to	Improve	VTS	Operations,”	in	Proceedings,	vol	64.2	(2007),	p.	16-17.	7	One	of	the	main	proponents	of	satellite	AIS	claims	that	satellite	AIS	was	a	direct	response	to	9/11	and	emerged	as	a	result	of	“a	counter-maritime	terrorism	study	to	determine	what	were	the	maritime	vulnerabilities	of	the	United	States	and	what	could	be	done	to	counter	them”	(Thomas	2003	and	2017).	8	ORBCOMM,	a	company	offering	“industrial	Internet	of	things	(IoT)	and	machine	to	machine	(M2M)	communications	solutions	designed	to	track,	monitor,	and	control	fixed	and	mobile	assets”	was	amongst	the	first	to	launch	AIS	satellite	receivers	in	2008.	It	now	operates	a	network	comprising	“18	AIS-enabled	satellites	that	feed	into	17	earth	stations	sited	in	strategic	locations	around	the	globe.”	See:	https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/ais-meets-iot	9	http://earthi.space/blog/satellites-prevent-maritime-piracy/		10	https://phys.org/news/2016-02-marine-vessel-tracking-lifesaver-wildlife.html		11	The	French	philosopher	Jacques	Ranciere	has	used	expression	“partition	of	the	sensible”	to	refer	to	what	he	calls	"the	distribution	and	re-distribution	of	times	and	spaces,	places	and	identities,	that	way	of	framing	and	re-framing	the	visible	and	the	invisible,	of	telling	speech	from	noise	and	so	on.”	In	this	sense,	the	term	should	be	understood	as	an	attempt	to	rethink	politics	as	“the	framing	of	a	specific	sphere	of	experience,”	rather	than	the	mere	exercise	of	power	or	struggle	for	power	as	it	is	commonly	understood.	12	In	order	to	carry	out	a	rescue	operation,	merchant	ships	need	to	divert	their	planned	course―the	shortest	line	connecting	two	ports―to	reach	the	area	of	operation,	significantly	slow	down	their	speed,	start	searching	using	a	zig-zag	sweep	pattern	and,	once	the	boat	is	located,	bring	their	navigation	to	a	halt	and	transfer	all	passengers	from	the	rescued	boat	or	provide	protection	from	waves	while	other	vessels	more	apt	for	rescue	arrive.	13	See	our	report,	“Death	by	Rescue	-	The	Lethal	Effects	of	the	EU’s	Policies	of	Non-Assistance,”	https://deathbyrescue.org/	14	“ICS:	Rescue	of	all	persons	at	sea	is	a	must,”	World	Maritime	News,	29	October	2015,	http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/141521/ics-rescue-of-all-persons-in-distress-at-sea-is-a-must/	(last	accessed	12	April	2016).	15	Press	release	by	Defend	Mediterranea,	25th	August	2017.	http://www.millebabords.org/spip.php?article30891		16	While	Scheel’s	quote	(2017)	refers	specifically	to	the	appropriation	on	the	part	of	migrants	of	the	means	and	methods	of	mobility	control,	we	think	this	concept	can	be	successfully	extended	to	capture	the	different	form	of	appropriations	at	play	in	the	use	of	AIS	technology	discussed	in	this	commentary.	
